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Abstract: This study aimed to examine the effect of corporate governance indicators such as the board
of directors, audit committee and audit quality on bank performance which is proxied by Camel Ratio
such asCAR, NPL, LDR, BOPO, andROE. This study used30 banks listed in the Indonesia Stock
Exchange as samples and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was used to examine the influence of
corporate governance indicators on bank’s performance. The test results reveal that the board of
directors as one of the corporate governance indicator sh as a significantly positive correlation to
bank’s performance, which means the higherthe level of supervision by the commissioners, the better
the performance of the bank. As for theaudit committee indicator, the result reveal positive effect on
the bank’s performance butinsignificant. Meanwhile, a corporate governance indicator of audit quality
hasa significant positive relationshipto the performance ofthe bank, meaning the higher the
auditquality ofabank, the higher the bank’s performance. This is consistent withthe previous studies. It
is concluded thatthe higherorbetterfunctioningthe board of directors, audit committee andaudit
qualityin the bank, the better the performance ofthe bank.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Bank Performance, Camel Ratio, the Board of Directors, the Audit
Committee, Audit Quality
INTRODUCTION
The banking industry has always been an object of interest for study since it has two
characteristics that distinguish it from other industries. First, it’sa highly regulated
industry.Every activity must be monitored and regulated by agency standard, which is carried out
by Central Bank of Indonesia.The number of regulations governing the banking business aims to
protect the interests of the community.It is a consequence caused by the second characteristics of
the bank i.e the banking industry is an industry that is based on trust, particularly the trust of its
customers.
As bank customer, people put their money in the bank without full guarantee from the
bank, even with a rate of return which is determined by the bank. Based on its role as an
intermediary andeconomic-driven, the bank will channel back the money collected from public
in other form of investment. In carrying out its activities the bank faces a variety of risks such as
credit risk, market risk, operational risk and legal risk. Thus, the bank needs to be managed with
good corporate governance by professional management with high integrity. Without good
corporate governance, the banking industry will be collapse, as happened in 1997.
The financial crisis which hits many countries in 1997-1998 was preceded by the financial
crisis in Thailand in 1997 and followed by crisis in Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong
and Singaporewhich eventually turned into the Asian financial crisis. These considered as a result of
weak practice of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) such as the close relationship between
government and business people, conglomeration and monopoly, protection, and market
intervention which makes these countries unprepared to enter the era of globalization and free
market(Tjager et al, 2003).
The 1997 crisis in Indonesia begins with the issuance of Banking Deregulation policy
package 1988 (Pakto 88) where the government and the Central Bank of Indonesia tried to go further
in banking deregulation which became the turning point of the various banking curbing in 1971-
1972. The issuance of new bank licensing that has been discontinued since 1971 was reopened by
Pakto 88. Similarly, the permit of the opening of a branch office or establishment of the People’s
Credit Bank (BPR) was easier with lower capital requirement. Afacility that never been given to the
banking sector. One of the fundamental clauses in Pakto 88 is permission for foreign exchange banks
that require the bank’slevel of health and assets for only at least Rp.100 million.This resulted in an
increase in the number of banks in Indonesia from around 111 banks in 1988 to as many as 240 banks
in 1995.The increase of number of banks has encouraged the increase of credit distributed to the real
sector. Thus it gives contribution to the improvement of moderate economic growth in the early 90’s.
Nevertheless, this condition has a negative effect and triggers an increase in the number of
banks and banking expansions aggressively. Besides that, there are also issues of cross ownership
and cross management in Indonesia’s financial industry. These two aspects are the cause of the
increasing number of ownership concentration in banking industry, which will increase the
likelihood of violation of legal lending limit to the company’s group. These are the underlying
causes of economic crisis and also impacting the banking sector severely.
After going through a period of economic crisis, the number of commercial banks in
Indonesia has decreased (from 237 banks in 1997 to only as many as 130 banks in 2006 or a decrease
of 45.2%), resulting from the freezing of 67 banks, as well as merger and acquisitions.The decrease
number is a result of the strict standards that must be met for the establishment of a bank, such as
capital structure, merger, acquisition and bank closures due to financial problems.
Considering those background and conditions, then one of the main causes of the banking
industry experienced a collapse during the crisis was relating to the poor management of the bank.
Valuable lessons can be learned from the financial crisis experienced by Indonesia whereas the
crisis caused by the weak implementation of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) in the banking
industry. The implementation of GCG in the bank aims to strengthen the internal condition of
the national banking system in dealing with increasingly complex risks, protecting the interest
of stakeholders and improving compliance toward legislation and regulations and ethical values
that generally accepted in the banking industry.
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD) has developed
a set ofcorporate governanceprinciples,or better known asThe OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance.The basic principles ofgood corporate governanceinclude the principles of transparency,
accountability, responsibility, independence, and equality or fairness, which aims to ensure the survival
and growth of the company in a sustainable manner.These basic principles are certainly very necessary in
the bank’s management where the public trust is its main components.
One of the factors needed to create effectivecorporate governance,especially after the financial
crisis in Asia is the role of the board of commissioners. Macey and O'Hara (2003) states that the
commissioners’ role is very important in a bank because the difference in the governance between bank
and non-bank. The main reason of this difference is the existence of banks’ other stakeholders such as
creditor and regulators.Bank directors should be responsible not only to shareholders, but also to
depositors, customers, and regulators.
Skully (2002) also states the critical role of the commissioners in the implementation ofcorporate
governancesince supervision will reduce the risk of using the taxpayers’ funds as mitigation or to resolve
a crisis.The application of goodcorporate governancecan also play a role in controlling lending practices
toward party that still has a relationship with the bank.
In the previous studies regarding the effect of the application of corporate governance, the
outcome show vary result on the relationship between the composition of the company’s board of
management with the company’s performance. Most studies find no effect or a significant correlation
between the presence of the management board in the company with the company's performance, such as
in Bhagat and Black’s (1999) and Hermalin and Weisbach’s (1991). Even research by Eisenberg, Sundgren,
and Wells (1998) found a negative relationship between board size with the performance of the company
or bank.
Meanwhile Rosentein and Wyatt (1990) found a positive and significant relationship between
stock prices and the proportion of independent board.It is also supported by research conducted by
Abeysekera (2008) toward companies in Kenya whereas the number of commissioners are
considered effective in the range more of five and less than 14 people.Large board size is more
effective than the small board size (Dalton et al, 1999; Nasution and Setiawan, 2007; and Abeysekera,
2008).And according to Andres, Azofra and Lopez (2005) the number of commissioners greatly
affect the activity of control and supervision.The larger the board size is expected to supervise the
management better, so it can improve the performance of banks or companies.
Moreover, the previous studies conducted by Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) regarding the
effect of the audit committee on the performance of the bankfound that the audit committee is an
important factor in the oversight of management.In that study, the average audit committee which is
owned by the company is 5 members in a range of 2 to 12 members.The number of audit committee
members affect the level of influence that can be given to the company, the size of the larger audit
committee is expected to maintain the bank’s good performance.
Another study that examines the effect of the independency of audit committee members
toward company’s performance was conducted by Nasution and Setiawan (2007) and Li et al
(2008).The results of their study revealed that audit committee members who are independent has a
positive effect on company performance.Thus the independent audit committee is expected to
improve the performance of the company.
On the other hand, Alijoyo (2003) states that the audit committee should be transparent,
starting with the necessity of audit charter and annual work programs written agenda of the audit
committee which is further supported by the regularity audit committee meeting.In carrying out the
obligations and responsibilities concerning the financial reporting system, the audit committee
should hold meetings three to four times a year (FCGI, 2001).The more often the audit committee
meetings were conducted the better the audit committee’s performance.With the regular meetings of
the audit committee it is expected to improve the bank’s performance.
According to Dezoort and Salterio (2001) audit committee members who have knowledge of
financial reporting and auditing provide support to external auditors whom in disputes with
management. Dezoort (1998) also found that knowledge and expertise in the field of
accounting/audit is required by the audit committee members in resolving disagreements between
management and the external auditors.The dispute between the management with the external
auditors may affect the performance of the company, therefore it is expected that the audit
committee could resolve the dispute and eventually result in the company’s good performance.
Moreover, another study that examine the effect of audit quality on the performance of
banks conducted by Kell (2001), which proves that the audit is a systematic process to obtain and
evaluate evidence objectively, relating to the assertion of the economic actions to measure the level
of concordance between the assertion with the criteria that has been established then communicating
the results to the parties concerned (Kell, 2001).Results of the audit process is the auditor's report
(audit opinion),i.e the report contains the fairness of the financial statements in accordance with the
generally acceptedaccounting principles.
The agency theory views the role of external auditors as a means of control that can be used
to eliminate or at least provide a signal on opportunistic practices or fraud committed by
management as earnings management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
Audit will reduce the information asymmetry that exists between management and stakeholders of
the company by allowing outsiders to verify the validity of the financial statements. Kinney and
Martin (1994) examined nine studies and found that the audit reduces the positive bias on net
income and net assets before audited.
Good quality of audit should be able to detect fraud committed by management such as
profit management and report the actual performance of the company so as not to deceive investors.
The size of public accounting firm could be expected to affect the quality of the audit because big
firm usually will not take risks in performing audit on the financial performance of its clients, and
tend to report the actual performance of the company, thus could trigger the company to really
improve the performance of its operations. The varied result from prior literature is caused by
theendogenousrelationship, namely matters resulting from the company itself (Hermalin and Weisbach,
1991) and causality (Kole, 1997) between the composition of company’s board and company’s
performance.
THEORETICAL STUDY AND HYPOTHESISDEVELOPMENT
Theories of Corporate Governance (GCG)
One of Corporate Governance theory was referring to agency theory (Syakhroza,
2003).Agency theory assumes that managers will act opportunistically to take personal
advantage before it meets the interests of shareholders. The agency theory arises because of
thedevelopment of modern management science that shifts the classical theory, i.e.the rule that
separates the owner of the company (principal) with the company manager (agent).When companies
grow big and shareholders increasingly dispersed, the agency cost is increasing and owners would to
perform an effective control toward the managers who manage the company.
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) potential conflicts of interest could occur between
related parties such as between the shareholders and the company manager (agency cost of equity) or
between the shareholders with the creditor (agency cost of debt).The agency costs include the
monitoring costs, bonding cost and residual loss. Monitoring costs is an expense paidby the principal to
measure, observe and control the behavior of the agent from deviating.These costs occur because of the
imbalance information between principals and agents. In certain situations, agents allowed to
expend company resources (bonding cost) to ensure that the agency will not act that may be detrimental
to the principal or to ensure the principal will provide compensation for it.Nevertheless, there is still a
difference between agent’s decisions with the decisions that will maximize the agency’s welfare.
Value for money that equivalent to a reduction of welfare that experienced by principals is called
residual loss.
Definitionof Good Corporate Governance
According to FCGI (2001), Good Corporate Governance is defined as a set of rules that govern
the relationship between shareholders, management (managers) of the company, the creditors,
government, employees and other internal and external stakeholders relating to their rights and
obligations or in other words a system that regulates and controls the company. Meanwhile Cadbury
Committee is a set of rules that define the relationship between shareholders, managers,creditors,
government, employees, and those other interested parties both internal and external with respect to the
their rights andresponsibilities.
Rahmawati et al (2006), defines Good Corporate Governance as a set of rules and principles
that include fairness, transparency, accountability, and responsibility, which regulate the relationship
between shareholders, management, the company (directors andcommissioners), creditors,
employees and other stakeholders with regard to the rights and obligations of each party. Based on the
definition of good corporate governance it can be concluded that, basically good corporate governance is
about systems, processes, and a set of rules that govern the relationship between the various
interested parties(stakeholders), namely the relationship between shareholders, board
commissioners, and the board of directors for the achievement of company objectives.
The objective of good corporate governance is to create added value for all interested
parties (stakeholders).Theoretically, the implementation of good corporate governance can increase the
company’s value by improving their financial performance, reducing the risk of the board of
commissioners with decisions that could benefit themselves and good corporate governance also can
boost investor confidence (Tjager et al., 2003).
Darmawanti, Rahayu, and Khomsiyah (2004), stated that the issue of corporate governance
arises because there is a separation between the ownership and the management of the
company, or often referred as an agency problems. A problem of agency in relation between capital
owners with the manager is the difficulty in ensuring that the funds will be invested in profitable
projects that will bring return. Moeljono (2002) explains that corporate governance is necessary
to reduce the agency problem between owners and managers.
Corporate Governance Principles
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) developed a set of
corporate governance principles, or better known as The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The
basic principles of good corporate governance include:
1. Transparency (Disclosure of information), that transparency in the decision making
process and openness in exposing material and relevant information about the company.
2. Accountability (accountability), i.e. clarity of function, structure, systems; and accountability of the
company so that the management of the company runs effective.
3. Responsibility (accountability), is a compliance in the management of the company to the right
company principles as well as laws and regulations.
4. Independency (autonomy), is a state where company is professionally managed with no conflict of
interest and influence or pressure from management that is not in accordance with the regulations
and legislation and the company’s principles.
5. Fairness (equality and fairness), is a fair and equal treatment in fulfilling stakeholder rights arising
under the agreement and applicable laws and regulations (Kaihatu, 2006).
Mechanism of Corporate Governance
In order to apply the corporate governance’s principles, the management of company is carrying
out the following matters:
1. General Meeting of Shareholders
2. Openness and Transparency
3. The existence of Independent Commissioners
4. Size Board of Commissioners
5. The Audit Committee
6. Ownership Structure
Previous Research Study
1. The effectofBoardofCommissioners on Bank’s Performance
Supervision system in the company is divided into two types, namely two-tier and one-tier system. In a
company that practice two-tier board system like in Indonesia, the supervisory role of the company in general
carried out by the board of commissioners, while in a company with one-tier board system the supervisory function
carriedout byboardof directors.
Previous studies regarding the importance of corporate governance’s implementation, especially in other
countries beside Indonesia, the term board of directors was used to describe its supervisory function. For instance,
research by Pathan (2007), which examines the size and independency of the board of directors and its influence on
the company’s performance on several banks in Thailand. Thailand was chosen as a research area since Thailand
also experienced severe financial crisis in 1997, just like Indonesia. The study was using fixed effect model of panel,
andit found that there isasignificant negative relationship betweenboard size withbank’sperformance in Thailand.
This is consistent with the hypothesisand show that smaller board sizewill be more effective in monitoring the bank
manager, while the boardwith a larger size is more vulnerable experiencing agency problem betweenthe ownersof
the company andthose whoruncompany’soperational activities (manager).
The second result obtained from the research was finding the positive relation between bank’s board
independency withbank’sperformance inThailand banks. The result revealedthat independent directors showeda
better performance in monitoring (especially in Thailand), because they have market reputation that need to be
maintained. Findings in these studies suggest the bank can improve itsperformance by reducing the number or size
of the boardandaddafewmoreindependent commissioners.
Research by Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) also found a negative relationship between board size
with the performance of the company or bank. Similarly, the research by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) also
revealed that the board with a smaller size would be more effective and can provide added value because it is easier
for coordination.
However, research by Abeysekera (2008) found a significant positive relationship between board size
and company’s performance in Kenya. The number of commissioners are considered effective in the range
of more than five and less than 14 people.Large board size is more effective than the small board size
(Dalton et al, 1999; Nasution and Setiawan, 2007; and Abeysekera, 2008).And according to Andres,
Azofra and Lopez (2005) the number of commissioners greatly affect the activity of controlling and
supervising. A larger board size is expected to supervise the management better, so it can improve
the performance of banks or companies.
In line with this, Adams and Mehran (2003) and Belkhir (2005) states that for US Bank
Holding Companies, it was found that the size of the board and its performance has a positive
relationship.This study suggests that the surveillance conducted by the board with a large number
of members or more will have the advantage that would exceed the costs incurred.Positive
relationship between the size of the board and the performance of the companies in the US can
further be explained due to mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry in the United States.
2. The effect on Audit Committee on Bank’s Performance
Another important component that supports the implementation of good corporate
governance is the audit committee (FCGI, 2001). In accordance with the Decree of Chairman of
Bapepam Number: Kep.29/PM/2004, the audit committee is a committee established by the board
of directors to carry out the task of supervision and management of the company.
Research conducted by Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) found that the audit committee is
an important factor in supervising the management. In that study, the average audit committee
which is owned by the company are 5 members in a range of 2 to 12 members.The number of audit
committee members affect the level of influence that can be given to the company, a larger size of
audit committee is expected to maintain bank’s better performance.
Meanwhile the study that examines the effect of independent audit committee members on
company or bank’s performance performed by Nasution and Setiawan (2007) and Li et al (2008). The
results of their study revealed that an independent audit committee member has a positive effect on
company performance. Thus the independent audit committee is expected to improve the
company’s performance.
On the other hand, Alijoyo (2003) states that the audit committee should be transparent,
starting with the necessity of audit charter and annual work programs written agenda of the audit
committee which is further supported by the regularity audit committee meeting. In carrying out the
obligations and responsibilities concerning the financial reporting system, the audit committee
should hold meetings three to four times a year (FCGI, 2001). The more often the audit committee
meetings were conducted the better the performance of the audit committee. A regular meeting of
the audit committee is expected to improve the bank’s performance.
According Dezoort and Salterio (2001) audit committee members who have knowledge of
financial reporting and auditing provide support to external auditors whom in disputes with
management. Dezoort (1998) also found that knowledge and expertise in the field of accounting and
auditing is required by the audit committee members in resolving disagreements between
management and the external auditors. A dispute between management with external auditors may
affect the performance of the company, therefore it is expected that the existence of audit committee
has a positive effect on resolving the dispute which eventually will improve the company’s
performance.
3. The effect of Audit Quality on Bank’s Performance
Audit is a systematic process to obtain and evaluate evidence objectively, relating to the
assertion of the economic actions to measure the level of concordance between these assertions with
the criteria then communicating the results to the parties concerned (Kell, 2001). Result of the audit
process is the auditor's report (audit opinion), i.e. the report contains the fairness of the financial
statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
From the agency theory perspective, the role of external auditors is viewed as a means of
control that can be used to eliminate or at least provide a signal on opportunistic practices or fraud
committed by management such as earnings management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986). Audit will reduce the information asymmetry that exists between management
and stakeholders of the company by allowing outsiders to verify the validity of the financial
statements. Kinney and Martin (1994) examined nine studies and found that the audit reduces the
positive bias on net income and net assets before audited.
Good audit of quality should be able to detect fraud committed by management such as
profit management and report the actual performance of the company so as not to deceive investors.
The size of public accounting firm could be expected to affect the quality of the audit because big
firm usually will not take risks in performing audit on the financial performance of its clients, and
tend to report the actual performance of the company, thus could trigger the company to really
improve the performance of its operations.
Research Hypothesis
Based on the analysis and previous studies, the hypothesis is stated as follows:
H1: The board of commissioners has an influence on bank’s performance.
H2: The audit committee has an influence on bank’s performance.
H3: Audit quality has an influence on bank’s performance.
RESEARCH METHODS
Model Research
To determine the influence of the independent variables of: Board of Commissioners, Audit
Committee and Audit Quality on the dependent variable of Bank Performance (CAR, NPL, LDR,
BOPO, and ROE) a model of Structural Equation Model (SEM) was used. Meanwhile, for the
measurement model, a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was used to indicate a latent variable
which was measured by one or more variables observed. In this case the latent variable is bank’s
performance while the observed variables used to measure bank performance variable is the
variable of the Board of commissioners, audit committee, and audit quality. So the research model
using the CFA is as follows:
Variable operationalization
Latent Variables
Latent variables in this study are Board of Commissionaires, Audit Committee, Audit
Quality and Bank’s Performance.
Board of Commissioners (BoC) was measured using 4 variables i.e. BoC 1, BoC 2, BoC 3, and BoC 4.
Audit Committee (AC) was measured using 5 variables: AC 1, AC 2, AC 3, AC 4, and AC 5. Quality
Audit (QA) was measured using two variables: QA 1 and QA 2. Bank Performance (BP) was
measured using 5 variables: BP 1, BP 2, BP 3, BP 4, and BP 5.
Variable Observed
Variables observed in this study consisted of 16 variables comprising:
1. Four variables of Board of Commissionaires (BoC). BoC 1 was measured using a board size, BoC
2 measured using the proportion of independent directors, BoC 3 was measured using a number
of board meetings, and BoC 4 measured using the educational background of the commissioner.
2. Five variables of AC. AC 1 was measured using a number of audit committee, AC 2 was
measured using a proportion of the audit committee independent, AC 3 was measured using a
number of audit committee meetings, AC 4 was measured using the work experience of the audit
committee members as an auditor, and AC 5 was measured using educational background of the
audit committee.
3. Two variables of QA. QA 1 was measured using dummy of the size of Public Accounting Firm
which conducts an audit of banks sampled in this study. If the company or bank was audited by
the Big 4 of Public Accounting Firm then the audit quality was considered high and on the other
hand if it was audited by non-Big 4 Public Accounting Firm, the quantity of audit was lower. QA
2 was measured using a dummy of the audit opinion given by an external auditor. A value of 1
used if the audit opinion obtained is unqualified, and if the audit opinion obtained other than
“unqualified” the value is 0.
Method of Collecting Data
Data used in this research is secondary data, such as annual reports and financial statements
of the banks listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in the year of 2009-2010. Data is taken
from official site of IDX (www. idx.co.id), and the official website of each company. Data of the
board of commissionaires and audit committees derived from bank’s annual reports. Meanwhile
data of CAMEL ratio for measuring bank performance derived from the bank’s financial statements.
Sample Selection Method
The unit of analysis in this study is banking company. And the population of this research is
all banks listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2009-2010.
Hypothesis Testing
In testing the hypothesis, the method of Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) in SEM was
applied.
According to Hair et. Al. (1998), evaluation of the degree of data fitness by using SEM model
is done through several stages, namely:
 Overall model fit
 Measurement model fit
 Structural model fit
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Based on data on Table 1, the descriptive statistics for each variable in this study are as
follows:
1. The average value of BoC 1 which is measured with the board size is as much as 4 people, with
a minimum of 3 people and a maximum of 8 people.
2. The average value of BoC 2 which is measured with the proportion of independent directors is
0.5. It means the number of independent board members compared to the number of
commissioners has the same proportions. Meanwhile the minimum number is 0667, and the
maximum value is 0.75.
3. The average value of BoC 3 which is measured by the number of board meetings is 10 meetings
a year. This is the same as the number of meetings required by the government, while the
minimum value is 4 which means the meeting is only conducted 4 times a year. And the
maximum value is 43 which is in excess of that required by the government.
4. BoC 4 which is measured using commissioner educational background found an average value
of 0.33. It means that the average member of the commissioner who has a background in
accounting is 1/3 of the total number of commissioners. While the minimum commissioners
who have an educational background in accounting is 0 meaning no commissioners in the bank
that has the educational background of accounting or economics. While the maximum value of
BoC 4 is 1.00 means that each member of the board of commissioners in a bank has a
background in accounting education.
Tabel 1. Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
BoC1 30 3.000 8.000 4.000 2.5000
BoC 2 30 .667 .750 . 500 .6552
BoC 3 30 4.000 43.000 10.000 1.3607
BoC 4 30 .000 1.000 0.330 .48918
AC 1 30 3.000 6.000 4.000 .38824
AC 2 30 .000 .750 .500 .6801
AC 3 30 2.000 16.000 13.000 7.8925
AC 4 30 .000 .667 .330 .3423
AC 5 30 .000 .667 .330 .2197
QA 1 30 .000 1.000 .700 .50855
QA 2 30 .000 1.000 .600 .49827
Valid N (listwise) 30
5. AC 1 which is measured using the number of audit committee found an average value of 4. It means
on average most banks have a total audit committee (external and internal) of 4 people, and the
minimum value of is at 3 which means that there is a number of bank that has 3 members of the
audit committee. Meanwhile the maximum is 6 meaning that there is a number of bank that has a
number of audit committee members as much as 6 people.
6. AC 2 which is measured using the proportion of independent audit committee found an average
value of 0.5. It means the number of independent audit compared to the number of audit committee
members as a whole have the same proportion. Meanwhile the minimum value of 0.667 means the
number of independent audit committee members has a smaller or less proportion compared with
the number of members of the audit committee as a whole. While the maximum value of 0.75 means
the number of independent audit committee members has nearly the same proportion as the
number of audit committee members as a whole.
7. The average value of AC 3 which is measured with the number of audit committee meetings found
as many as 13 meetings in a year, while the minimum meeting is twice a year. And the maximum
value of 16 times is in excess of that required by the government.
8. The average value of 0.33 was found on AC 4, which is measured with the experience of the audit
committee members worked as an auditor. It means 1/3 of the total number of members of the audit
committee has an experience working as an auditor. The minimum values of 0.00 meaning no
member of the audit committee in the bank that has an experience working as an auditor. While the
maximum value is 0.667 means that the number of audit committee members who has an experience
working as an auditor reach 70% of the total number of members of the audit committee as a whole.
9. AC 5 which is measured with the educational background of the audit committee also found an
average value of 0.33 and the minimum value of 0.00. The maximum value of 0.667 means that
almost 70% of the total number of members of the audit committee that has educational background
of accounting.
10. On average QA 1 as measured using the dummy of the size of the Public Accounting Firm which
conduct an audit to the sampled banks found a value of 0.70. It means that most of the banks in this
study are audited by the Big Four accounting firm.
11. Using the dummy of audit opinion, the average value for QA 2 is 0.60. It means that most of the
banks in this study obtain audit opinion of "unqualified" from the external auditor.
Structural Equation Model:
The structural equation model in testing the hypothesis is as follows
KNJ = 0.56*BoC + 0.033*AC + 0.44*QA, Error var.= 0.066 , R² = 0.93
(0.13) (0.100) (0.10) (0.057)
4.40 0.33 4.26 1.17
From the structural model above it shows that the hypothesis of H1 and H3 showed a
significant result, while H2 proved insignificant result.
The insignificant result of H2 can be proven from the descriptive statistic of audit committee
meeting variable that reached an maximum value of 16 times which exceed the government
requirement. The result also shows that the accounting education background and experience as an
auditor does not have a significant effect on the performance of the audit committee on bank
performance.
To determine the coefficient of determination of structural equation, the value of R2 should be
calculated (Wijanto, 2006). Lisrel test results that can be seen in Equation Reduced Form obtained the
value of R 2 for structural equation in this study. The value of R 2 in this research model is 0.93, which
means the model is able to explain 93% of the change in the latent variable of Bank's performance.
Overall t value results of the three hypotheses proposed in this study can be summarized as follows:
Table 2. t-value result for each hypothesis
Hypothesis Path Estimates t-value Conclusion
1 BoC BP 0.56 4.40 Significant
2 AC BP 0.033 0.33 Insignificant
3 QA BP 0.44 4.26 Significant
Results of path diagram below, shows the structural model generated from the lisrel:
Analysis of Test Results
Based on structural equation model, it confirms that the commissioner has a positive
influence on bank performance significantly. It means that the greater supervision by the board of
commissioners on banking operations, the higher the performance generated by banks. The results
of this study reinforce the results of the previous studies by Rosentein and Wyatt (1990), Dalton et al
(1999), Nasution and Setiawan (2007), and Abeysekera (2008).
The second hypothesis which examines the effect of the audit committee on bank
performance also finds a positive result but insignificant. These results reinforce the results of
previous studies of Herwidayatmo (2000), Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003), and Abeysekera (2008).
This can be explained from the bank that has a large number of audit committee members
and exceeds the requirement set by Bank of Indonesia and Capital Market Supervisory Agency and
Financial Institution. There are also banks that held audit committee meetings up to 16 times in one
year which exceeds that required by the government.
The third hypothesis that evaluated the effects of audit quality on bank's performance shows
a positive and significant result. It means that the greater the quality of the audit of a bank, the better
the performance generated by the bank. These results reinforce the results of previous studies such
as research by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Watts and Zimmerman (1986).
CONCLUSION
1. This research is based on the previous studies related to the effect of the corporate governance’s
application on the bank’s performance. The purpose of this study is to see to which extend the
application of corporate governance can affect the bank performance. This model uses 30 data
of banking company.
2. Hypothesis 1 used to test whether the board of directors as one of the indicators in the
corporate governance affects the banks' performance significantly. The structural equation
shows a positive result which means commissioners has a positive effect on the bank
performance. The better the performance of the board of commissioners, the better the
performance of the banking system.
3. Hypothesis 2 that tests whether the audit committee as one of the indicators in the corporate
governance affects the banks' performance proved to have no influence. It shows in the output
of structural equations that reveal positive result. It means the audit committee has a positive
effect on bank’s performance. Whereas the better the performance of the board of
commissioners, the better the performance of the banking system.
4. Hypothesis 3 which test whether audit quality as one of the indicators in the corporate
governance affects the banks' performance proved a significant effect. The structural equation
result shows a positive value which means the positive effect of the audit committee on the
bank’s performance. The better the performance of the board of commissioners, the better the
performance of the banking system.
Suggestion
Based on these results it is expected that in future studies to increase the number of samples
and widens the years of observation (firm years) and add a variable in corporate governance that
might could influence the bank’s performance.
Limitations Research
Limitation of this study is the small number of respondents therefore it cannot be tested with
weighted least square (WLS) method which is likely will give different results.
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